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Abstract—Blockchain technology, while maturing, is still lack-
ing features that would be considered indispensable in real-
world business applications. In particular, the lack of transaction
confidentiality in a public blockchain is a challenging problem.
A possible solution might be the concept of a private blockchain.
However, maintaining such permissioned blockchains requires
resources, depends on a central authority and contradicts the
original philosophy of pioneering blockchain systems such as
Bitcoin. In this paper, the concept of a Virtual Private Blockchain
(VPBC) is proposed as a mechanism to create a blockchain
architecture with properties akin to those of a private blockchain,
however leveraging existing public blockchain functionality. A
VPBC can be set up between individuals or organisations, does
not require any significant administrative maintenance, inherits
all the functionality from the public blockchain, and achieves
anonymity and transaction confidentiality with respect to any
public blockchain node who does not belong to the VPBC.
Building on this theoretical concept, it is then shown how the
cryptographic technique of secret sharing can be used in order
to implement a simple VPBC architecture. A proof-of-concept
architecture has been created and early experiments indicate
that the creation of VPBCs for potential real-world application
scenarios might be feasible.
Index Terms—Public Blockchain; Private Blockchain; Permis-
sioned Blockchain; Blockchain Confidentiality; Security Overlays;
Virtual Private Networks; Secret Sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to recent research, the adoption of Blockchain
technology is steadily increasing, and major business organi-
sations are currently investigating how to benefit from features
such as immutability and public verifiability of data, decen-
tralised architecture and (pseudo) anonymity of transactional
data. As blockchain technology is gradually maturing, the
quest for suitable applications is shaping the future of decen-
tralised, networked functionality providing data integrity ser-
vices and innovations in the fields of big data, cloud computing
and cryptography. However, current blockchain technologies
are not always able to address all specific security require-
ments for individual, specialist applications. For example, a
public blockchain application would not be able to provide
the required confidentiality to allow independent financial
institutions to share sensitive data securely and anonymously.
A possible solution to this problem is the concept of
a private blockchain. This is a restricted-access network,
where permission has to be granted to prospective partic-
ipants for transactional and administrative participation in
network activities. Typically, cryptocurrencies are built on
public blockchains, in which anyone can elect to join and
participate. By contrast, private blockchains are targeted to-
wards businesses and institutions who want the benefits of
blockchain technology (e.g., distributed ledger consensus and
immutability) but want to limit the scope of the facility, to in-
house entities and trusted partners. However, maintaining such
a private blockchain requires resources. Also, it contradicts the
original intention of the pioneering Bitcoin technology, aiming
to not rely on a central body.
The fundamental research question addressed in this pa-
per is whether there are alternatives to the concept of a
private blockchain architecture. A focus is on innovative
security architectures, the application of suitable cryptographic
techniques, and their use within the blockchain architecture.
Furthermore, an assessment of the benefits arising from the
real-world use cases of this architecture is of importance.
In this paper, the following contributions are made. First,
the novel concept of a Virtual Private Blockchain (VPBC) is
shaped, implemented and initially evaluated. A VPBC is a
mechanism to create a blockchain architecture with properties
akin to those of a private blockchain, however leveraging
existing public blockchain functionality. Second, we show how
to use the cryptographic technique of secret sharing in order
to implement a simple VPBC. Finally, we devise a proof-of-
concept architecture and first experiments indicate that there
appear to be no major obstacles in adopting VPBCs in future
real-world application scenarios.
To our knowledge, both the conceptual ideas of this paper
as well as the application of secret sharing in an architecture
across several blockchain systems are novel and have not been
proposed in this form, in the literature to date.
This paper is organised as follows: In Section II, con-
cepts and techniques for securing blockchain functionality
are presented. Section III contains the description of the
VPBC architecture, while in Section IV, an implementation
and evaluation is reported. Section V relates the results of this
paper to the literature, and the paper concludes in Section VI.
II. BLOCKCHAIN SECURITY
In this section, we review the basic security aspects of
the blockchain. We will start with briefly recalling security
concepts and techniques currently in use for achieving existing
security goals in publicly available blockchain systems, with
a focus on confidentiality. This will be followed by more
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advanced techniques improving specific dependability and
security aspects of the blockchain suggested in the recent
literature as conceptual contributions or used in prototype
solutions.
A. Cryptographic Techniques for Blockchain Security Features
A number of cryptographic techniques are in place in
mainstream blockchain applications in order to fulfil basic
security requirements.
Cryptographic hash functions are used in order to ensure the
integrity of the public ledger, a global record of Blockchain
transactions. Based on a suitable, efficient data structure (the
hash tree), even minor changes in large amounts of data
can be detected and repaired if necessary. Furthermore, the
principle of mining which is a digital protocol, mimicking
the creation of scarce resources, implements necessary work
for creating new, validated blocks by performing a pre-image
attack on given hash digest values. Validation can be carried
out efficiently by re-computing the digest.
The authenticity of digital messages and data is usually
demonstrated or verified using digital signatures. It allows
for the effective origin and message integrity as well as
non-repudiation of communication between two parties. In
a Blockchain, participants can sign transactions with their
private keys. In Bitcoin, the concept of a wallet is imple-
mented, controlling the spending power of a user based on
a private and public key pair. Cryptocurrency transactions
are not completely anonymous in nature, however, the true
identities of transactors are hidden and are not provided as
part of the accessible data stored on the public blockchain.
The transactions are considered to be pseudonymous as the
only form of identity any node on the network possesses is
the wallet identity which effectively is the public key of the
wallet that is owned by the node.
B. Establishing Transaction Confidentiality
More recently, a number of Blockchain systems have started
addressing the lack of confidentiality for transactional infor-
mation, through a variety of mechanisms. We shall present
two approaches, provided by the prominent Blockchain sys-
tems Hyperledger Fabric and Multichain. These are also, the
systems we have used for our first experiments towards a novel
security solution, as described later on in this paper.
1) HyperLedger Fabric Channels : Hyperledger is an open-
source ecosystem of blockchain services run and maintained
by IBM which has developed a means of providing confiden-
tiality by the use of a private communication “subnet”. The
principle is to implement so-called Channels [1] between two
or more specific network members. A complex infrastructure
of cryptographic protocols and a range of security services
including confidential inter-channel communication and trans-
actions are available. While this provides a sophisticated and
powerful infrastructure for achieving the desired confidential-
ity on the Blockchain, it requires expertise and resources in
order to deploy, configure, and manage a HyperLedger Fabric
Blockchain within one or potentially several organisations.
2) Multichain Stream Confidentiality : The Multichain
Blockchain system acknowledges the confidentiality loss of
any raw data stored on a public ledger and proposes to address
this by using a combination of symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography. Any data intended to be submitted to the system
is encrypted before being stored and timestamped on the chain.
The password for reading the encrypted data is only made
available to a subset of blockchain participants, leaving others
unable to read it.
The method makes use of three blockchain streams [2],
whose purposes are as follows:
• A first stream is used by participants to distribute their
public Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) keys.
• A second stream is used to publish large pieces of data,
bulk-encrypted using the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) algorithm.
• A third stream provides data access. For each authorised
participant, a stream entry is created which stores a
security credential encrypted with the participant’s public
key.
While this architecture appears secure and efficient, it requires
the availability of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) expert for
effective management.
C. Advanced Blockchain Dependability and Security
In this section, the specialist topic area of using advanced
cryptographic techniques for improving blockchain security
is explored. This will help in illustrating the novelty of
our approach in terms of how we achieve anonymity and
confidentiality, using the cryptographic technique of secret
sharing.
The main overall challenges for the blockchain are scala-
bility and privacy. The first challenge is a serious reason why
currently, most blockchain systems do not qualify as main-
stream payment systems. They do not have enough processing
power to process enough transactions per second. The second
challenge – as already explored earlier – is problematic for
both businesses and individuals: transactions are stored on
a public database (the public ledger), which does not allow
confidentiality.
Recently, the cryptographic technique of secret sharing and
more generally threshold cryptography have been suggested in
order to improve scalability and security aspects of blockchain
security. This emerging area has so far only been explored in
a small number of papers [3]–[6].
In [3] [6], the authors address the scalability of blockchain
transactions by reducing the storage requirements for the pub-
lic ledger, using an information dispersal scheme. A significant
reduction in storage cost is achieved and furthermore, the
integrity of transaction data can be improved. As an additional
outcome, a reduction in energy cost due to block validation
(bitcoin mining) is also achieved. Their scheme mainly focuses
on reliability and redundancy, but not on security although
there would be scope to do so. The key technique required for
security enhancements is secret sharing, which can be seen
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as a variation of the information dispersal employed by the
previous authors.
The paper [4] pursues this research avenue further by using
a space-efficient secret sharing scheme. It differs from the
previous work by not relying on encryption but solely on
creating secret shares of a transaction block, and store them on
different nodes altogether. This reduces storage requirements
and communication costs. It also achieves confidentiality,
although a rigorous security analysis is not undertaken and
appears difficult due to the potential security weaknesses of
the underline secret sharing scheme.
The paper [5] addresses the lack of a more sophisticated
internal controls against fraud in Bitcoin. A new cryptographic
threshold-signature scheme for Elliptic Curve based digital
signatures is introduced. Wallets that create transactions using
this signature algorithm are called threshold wallets. The major
advantage of this scheme is the fact that the private key used
to create the digital signature of the transaction is not required
as an entire quantity, but is stored as shares in a distributed
fashion. This achieves joint control of Bitcoins and extends
the build-in multi-signature feature of Bitcoin, by addressing
the problem of “hot storage”. Two applications of the new
threshold scheme are presented in the form of use cases:
for businesses, to eliminate the problem with single-point of
failure and for individuals, a two-factor secure Bitcoin wallet.
The authors suggest that using this algorithm could be key to
overcoming some of Bitcoin’s biggest challenges, preventing
organisations or individuals from using the system to conduct
business transactions.
III. VIRTUAL PRIVATE BLOCKCHAINS
In this section, the main contribution of this paper is
presented. Inspired by previous work on secure overlay ar-
chitectures (see further in Section V), a blockchain architec-
ture achieving security goals typically benefited by Private
Blockchains is devised. An emphasis is on ensuring confiden-
tiality and anonymity of sensitive transaction information that
would be disclosed to all other users if it was contained in the
public ledger of a traditional blockchain. These security goals
are achieved by leveraging the existing Public Blockchain
functionality through a suitable mechanism. The resulting
Virtual Private Blockchain architecture resembles that of a
traditional virtual private network, which explains the termi-
nology “Virtual” following the original concept introduced for
Online Social Networks in [7].
A. VPBC Characteristics
A VPBC has a number of interesting and appealing charac-
teristics, both in terms of functionality and security properties.
• The term “virtual” is justified as a VPBC utilises existing
Blockchain functionality and is by nature a Blockchain
itself. In particular, a VPBC inherits any built-in, internal
Blockchain security mechanisms.
• A VPBC is not visible to other Blockchain users that
are not part of it, and it is transparent to its users. This
achieves both usability and security, which is a desirable
characteristic.
• Furthermore, it should be possible for users to be part of
multiple VPBCs, and the impact of a VPBC on the overall
Blockchain performance should not be noticeable.
Any specific VPBC implementation would have to ensure that
these characteristics hold, that the precise mechanisms of inner
workings would be hidden to the user, and that they do not
adversely affect usability (and user experience).
We interpret the individual public blockchains as black
boxes, operating in a transparent manner, with the sole purpose
being the validation of transactions followed by storing them
in the public ledger. The overall impact of the individual
blockchains’ mining process and types of consensus algorithm
(proof-of-work, proof-of-stake) on the VPBC are not investi-
gated more in detail in this paper, although this would be an
interesting piece of future work.
B. Basic Idea
In order to implement a VPBC, one needs to substitute
confidential transaction content with pseudo-content or, more
specifically, data bits of the originally intended content through
information dispersal. The precise choice of this pseudo-
content will strongly depend on the particular blockchain
application and will need to be carefully analysed prior to
setting up the VPBC. Furthermore, a mechanism for reversing
the substitution process is needed, so that other members of
the VPBC can retrieve the original information. This might
require exchanging secret information amongst participants
of the VPBC and will have to be achieved using an out-of-
bound channel, such as an email or a phone conversation.
This is the equivalent of setting up a VPN in a traditional
networking architecture, based on a manual configuration of
keys for encryption.
The basic idea is simple, and an explanation using the
Bitcoin application is straightforward. Assume Alice wants to
pay Bob 100 bitcoin but would like to conceal this value to
others who have access to the Bitcoin public ledger. Alice
could split the amount into two parts, say 100 = 30 + 70,
send 30 bitcoin to Bob, convert the remaining 70 bitcoin to
a different cryptocurrency and use the corresponding, alter-
native blockchain architecture to pay Bob. Subject to minor
fluctuations, Bob is satisfied, having received the total amount
via the two individual systems. The same idea could then be
extended to using more than two blockchains, making it more
difficult for an eavesdropper to reconstruct the real, original
information.
While this method is effective for numerical values, it
would be more difficult to apply for symbolic information. For
example, if an address such as “Washington, D.C., USA” was
to be split into town and country information and included
in two different transactions, an attacker could potentially
spot the correlation between these transactions. This could
help in narrowing down search space or even to identify the
used scheme. In the next section, we will present a more
sophisticated approach which solves this problem.
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C. Secret Sharing Approach
Expanding on the basic approach explained in the previous
section, the precise cryptographic scheme that is underlying
the VPBC architecture developed in this paper is the technique
of secret sharing. The idea of secret sharing is to divide given
data (the secret s) into n parts (the shares) in such a way that
knowing (at least) m shares allows for reconstructing s. In an
ideal secret sharing scheme, knowledge of less than m shares
will not reveal any information on s. A secret sharing scheme
with parameters m and n satisfying the aforementioned prop-
erties is also called a (m,n)-threshold scheme. A popular
scheme is based on polynomial interpolation, introduced by
Shamir [8].
Our VPBC architecture can now be explained as follows.
Rather than using the example of Bitcoin, consider a generic
public blockchain, and a requested transaction with sensi-
tive transaction information t, requiring protection. Using a
suitable ideal (m,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, t will
be shared as n pieces of information (transaction shares)
t1, . . . , tn, and these will be used for the individual transac-
tions, executed on n independent public blockchains. Note that
the resulting shares are random numbers and do not preserve
any patterns that might be in the initial secret. The recipient,
prior to using the scheme, has been informed about the
selected blockchains. As soon as there are new transactions, a
subset of m transactions (which in reality are shares of the real
transaction) will be collated and the original secret transaction
data can be reconstructed.
D. Security
In this section, we discuss the security of our VPBC
approach. We showed that a VPBC implementation based on
secret sharing is secure against any attacker being limited
to accessing less than m blockchains, provided a (m,n)-
threshold secret sharing scheme is used. If the secret sharing
scheme is an ideal scheme, no information about the original
transaction data is revealed by intercepting any of the shares.
Furthermore, any collection of at the most m− 1 shares still
does not yield any information about the original secret, in an
information-theoretic sense. The security principle underlying
the approach is security through obscurity. Provided that the
specific transaction data protected through secret sharing is
selected carefully and the resulting transaction shares appear
innocuous, the technique could then be seen as a way of hiding
information akin to steganography by cover modification.
In order to retrieve the sensitive information, an authorised
user has to collate a collection of m transaction shares and
apply the reconstruction method of the specific secret sharing
scheme. In conclusion, this approach provides confidentiality
under the assumption that no more than m − 1 blockchains
would be attacked.
A number of attacks on the scheme exist, and we describe
two approaches which appear the most straightforward.
1) Brute-Force Attack: In order to carry out an attack on the
confidentiality of a VPBC transaction, the correct correspond-
ing combination of transaction shares could be identified using
brute-force searching across m different blockchains, users
and different transactions per user. In addition, the particular
secret sharing scheme would have to be known in order to
reconstruct the initial transaction from the shares.
In order to gauge the feasibility of the attack, we can
gather the following data: currently, there is an estimated
number of about over 6900 public blockchains [9] available
on the market at the time of this writing, with a tendency of
this number to grow in the near future [9] [10]. This yields
n ≤ 6900 and m ≤ n for the secret sharing parameters, and






that need to be brute-forced. Denote by T the average number
of daily transactions in the n participating blockchains. Then,





Tm transaction combinations per day to be
considered. The resulting data that needs processing is likely to
be huge. For example, there are approximately T ≈ 300, 000
daily Bitcoin transactions [11]. On the other hand, the use of
a (m, 6900)-secret sharing scheme might not be very feasible,
and a balance between the level of provided protection and the
computational effort for creating (and reconstructing) shares
need to be found. This interesting question is planned to be
investigated further by our research.
2) Deanonymisation Attack: Another way to attack this
scheme would be to carry out deanonymisation (data-
reidentification) techniques in order to identify users, fre-
quently engaging with the same set of blockchains, in order
to narrow down the number of required searches. While
feasible in principle, it requires installing and monitoring of a
maximum number of possible blockchain systems, up to the
theoretical number of 6900, c.f. previous section. A criminal
organisation or any other group of professional attackers could
well cope with the demands of this attack, but it would be
unlikely to be feasible for an individual.
On the other hand, any of these attacks resulting in a
successful breach of confidentiality could be prevented by
adding an out-of-band channel between individual users, for
example using email or text message. If one of the transaction
shares is transmitted on this channel, a successful attack
purely based on processing the blockchain data would not be
possible. As eavesdropping on the email message would be
relatively easy, a further strengthening of the security using for
example Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or Secure/Multipurpose
Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) should be implemented.
While still possible for attackers with higher privilege (such
as governments or technically more advanced cybercriminals),
this improved method would be worthwhile, as it achieves
a considerable strength of the security with a manageable
overhead.
IV. SYSTEM SIMULATION
One reason why Blockchain technology is enjoying grow-
ing popularity and rapid adoption is the availability of free
implementations. The research described in this paper aims to
provide a publicly available VPBC system, implemented as
an interface for common blockchain implementation such as
Multichain or Fabric Ledger, using a range of programming
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languages including Java and Python. This interface will allow
processing transactions prior to their sending to the indi-
vidual public blockchain systems. Typically, a cryptographic
technique such as secret sharing will be applied in order to
implement confidentiality. Efficiency and ease of use will be
taken into account.
In order to investigate the feasibility of our proposed VPBC
architecture, we simulated a proof-of-concept VPBC based
on leveraging two Multichain blockchain systems. The two
private Multichain blockchain systems (A and B) were set up
on different instances of Ubuntu 12.04 LTS servers, with node
A and node B representing cryptocurrency payment and digital
value exchange systems (public blockchains). Multichain pro-
vides an inter-communication Application Program Interface
(API), giving access to the blockchain background application.
This API was used by a separate process, implementing our
Virtual Private Blockchain, where the desired transaction is
generated and executed via a smart contract. We may refer
to this as a (virtual) node C. The client process, which can
run any of the three Linux systems or a dedicated machine,
generates the smart contract, performs the splitting (or more
generally, the secret sharing) of the asset and creates the terms
of the individual smart contracts by initiating the payment on
node A and node B. The transactions on node A and node B
are verified by the blockchain, and upon successful execution
of both transactions, our system will report a successful
conclusion/execution of the virtual transaction.
The commands below show an automated process of as-
set transfer on the Multichain blockchain using the bash
script command and the process builder function in the Java
programming language. The first instruction launches the
blockchain in the background and then, using the instruction
in the second line, one is able to see connected nodes with
the necessary permissions to transact with the primary node.
With that information, the third and fourth instructions show
available assets on all connected nodes. The last two instruc-
tions implement the asset transfer and confirm the successful
execution of the transaction.





multichain-cli VPBC sendasset 1...asset1 100;
multichain-cli VPBC gettotalbalances 0;
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, a brief literature review on security overlays
for social network system architectures and instant messaging
protocols is given. A discussion section helps to contrast this
previous work with our VPBC framework presented in this
paper.
A. Virtual Private Network Overlay Architectures
Several key papers [7], [12]–[16] have introduced and es-
tablished the idea of improving security features of a network
system architecture by creating a higher-level architecture
based on a network security protocol bearing similarities to
a virtual private network. While preserving the functionality
of the original system, additional benefits such as sender
and recipient anonymity or message confidentiality can be
implemented.
In [7], the authors introduce the notion of a Virtual Private
Social Network (VPSN), achieving the goal of implement-
ing the anonymity of user-generated content in an Online
Social Network (OSN). Their terminology is motivated by
the similarity to a traditional Virtual Private Network (VPN),
where users of the VPSN corresponds to network devices in
a VPN. An implementation based on encryption and using an
out-of-band channel was reported in the follow-up work [7],
where the authors describe a Firefox browser plug-in called
FaceVPSN.
In [12] and later [13], a different cryptographic technique
is used to implement a related goal: the idea is to use
steganography to hide posts in a social network by making
them “socially indistinguishable” and hence difficult to detect.
The need for an out-of-band is also present in this method.
An alternative architecture based on a distributed com-
munication protocol with n channels has been proposed in
[15], combining steganography with an (m, n)-threshold secret
sharing scheme, applied to the plaintext message, followed
by hiding the resulting individual shares in a suitably crafted
carrier-medium.
In [16], a secure channel between two OSN Friends using
instant social messaging is established based on a different
type of distributed steganography. This implements a secu-
rity control for message content facing an untrusted OSN
provider. An Android mobile app prototype implementation
is described, using two instant social messaging channels
(Twitter and Google+).
The idea of overlay security architectures has also been
applied to insecure network protocols. In [17], a secure multi-
channel protocol for SMS banking is developed. The crypto-
graphic technique of steganography is used in two different
information-theoretical models, inspired by the low-entropy
and high-entropy approach of [13]. The resulting protocol
achieves confidentiality of an SMS-banking transaction against
an untrusted GMS service provider. An extended version of
the protocol [18] also provides resistance against delay and
replay-attacks, using cryptographic nonces.
B. Discussion
Both the idea of security overlay architectures and the
cryptographic technique of secret sharing has been the initial
inspiration for the work in this paper, in terms of concept and
implementation.
To our knowledge, the security overlay presented in this
paper is novel and unique in the context of blockchains, and
there are some subtle differences compared to the previous
works: a VPBC is not serving as a security control against a
centralised communication service provider (such as an OSN
provider). In fact, the communication setting is decentralised
right from the start and remains as such. The VPBC archi-
tecture introduces several layers of the same communication
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model, due to the use of multiple blockchain implementations.
This use of secret sharing is fundamentally different from that
in [4] as, in a VPBC, shares are stored on different Blockchain
implementations.
A VPBC architecture distributes the single public ledger
(containing the transaction data) vertically onto the specific,
chosen blockchain implementations while keeping the hori-
zontal distribution of the public ledger as an entity, copied
across all blockchain nodes, and kept in sync. Hence, a VPBC
could be classified as a new type of blockchain technology
bearing similarities with a Permissioned Blockchain as it
is using a public ledger and a closed group of validators
(the individual members of the VPBC who have to arrange
membership out-of-band) while introducing a new type of
ledger distribution – vertically rather than horizontally.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel Blockchain architecture is introduced
by designing a security overlay, spanning across multiple
Blockchain implementations. The resulting system is referred
to as a Virtual Private Blockchain (VPBC) and can be inter-
preted as a Permissioned Blockchain with vertical (rather than
horizontal) distribution of the public ledger. An evaluation of
a prototype VPBC system simulation is reported.
Blockchain technology has been met with scepticism from
many parties. Apart from security issues, the apparent lack of
current mainstream use cases and applications, potential vio-
lations of data protection (such as the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)) and other shortcomings, there is also a
danger of private organisations misusing data stored in private
Blockchains. A VPBC might offer a solution to this problem
as there is no central ledger database, offering the opportunity
to exploit transaction data by a single entity for commercial
purposes.
On the other hand, one drawback of the VPBC architecture
is the additional overhead required for sending and validat-
ing several transactions, for each transaction on the VPBC
although, in practice, this might be compensated for by the
resulting security benefits. Furthermore, any VPBC – while
offering attractive features in terms of confidentiality and
anonymity – can also be subject of misuse. For example, illegal
activities such as money laundering would be much easier to
implement using a VPBC than other Blockchain architectures.
As with any security solution, frequently there are ethical
issues attached to its use and misuse, and developers and users
alike need to remain mindful of these aspects.
In the same way as nowadays, adopters of cloud computing
routinely use multiple clouds and the first multi-cloud systems
have been suggested, the idea of a multi-blockchain will
become more acceptable over time. Eventually, the idea of
a VPBCs might become more mainstream as well. At this
current moment in time, it can only be speculated what the
precise future holds for the Blockchain, whether it is “virtual”
or “real”.
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